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WAR CRIMINALS: THEIR PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT. By Sheldon
Glueck. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1944. Pp. viii, 250, xii. $3.00.
IN the course of this war large numbers of Germans and of their collabo-
rationists have committed acts which are being characterized as war crimes.
They have operated camps for the mass murder of civilians, enslaved people
of occupied territories, indiscriminately killed large numbers of innocent
hostages, and indulged in torture; and they have not done these things as
unauthorized individuals on their own. Unauthorized atrocities occur in all
armies and in all wars. The acts now in question were committed by order
and authorization of the leaders of the German Reich and carried out by
rank and file military and civilian officials in their regular line of duty. We
have less information concerning reported atrocities by the Japanese, but it
appears that some of them at least have similar war crimes to their credit.
Individuals responsible for these war crimes are beginning to fall into
Allied hands; yet, to judge by press reports as this is being written, the
United Nations have still to settle upon a united program for dealing with
important categories of these offenders, and this despite the shortness of
time remaining for the task.'
How should the offenders be treated? In this book Professor Glueck
delivers his answer as a criminologist and as a lawyer. His qualifications-
including some of the best-known American studies of the conditioning fac-
tors of the usual varieties of crime and delinquency, and of the results of
varying forms of correctional treatment-are of course superior to the
resources which most of those contributing to the "what to do" literature on
this subject have had to offer. The result is a considered, detailed, and
thoroughly documented discussion; and it is impressive.
The issues of policy and of law involved in this problem may be reduced to
four basic questions: (1) What ib our conception-and rating scale-of war
crimes? (2) What is our post-war concern as victors with these war-time and
pre-war-time offenders? (3) Are we institutionally equipped to deal with any
1. Tens of thousands of names of alleged German war criminals have already been
submitted to the United Nations War Crimes Commission in London. For some time it
appeared doubtful that Axis perpetrators of crimes against their own subjects, because of
race, religion or political beliefs, would be included in the category of war criminals, but the
British and United States Governments are now reported to be in agreement with a recoin-
mezidation of the Commission that this class be so treated. It is also apparently contem-
plated that Axis Heads of State and other major leaders will be punished as war criminals,
but whether they are to be tried before a judicial tribunal or punished by political decision
has not been definitely announced. See MacCormac, Big Three Renew Promise to Punish
War Criminals, N. Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1945, § 4, p. 4, cols. 6-7; Hulen, Grew Widens Area of
Nazi War Crime, N. Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1945, p. 6, col. 1.
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or all categories of these offenders as criminals? And (4), assuming that the
offenders can be brought satisfactorily to judgment, what should then be
done with them?
I
War criminals are carefully and uncompromisingly defined in this book,
as follows:
".... persons-regardless of military or political rank-who, in
connection with the military, political, economic or industrial
preparation for or waging of war, have, in their official capacity,
committed acts contrary to (a) the laws and customs of legitimate
warfare or (b) the principles of criminal law generally observed in
civilized States; or who have incited, ordered, procured, counseled,
or conspired in the commission of such acts; or, having knowledge
that such acts were about to be committed, and possessing the duty
and power to prevent them, have failed to do so." 2
Heads of State and others in positions of responsibility who, whether or not
they personally ordered or even knew of a particular atrocity, could be
considered as being in an accomplice or co-conspiratorial relation to the
atrocity, are included in this definition; and the concept is not confined to the
military. Political leaders are involved, and so are the "high-ranking, policy-
framing industrialists and bankers with political connections who more in-
directly participated in or conspired to commit crimes (largely wholesale
thefts and receipt of stolen goods) as part of a general scheme of economic
conquest to go hand in hand with the military." 3 The author is obviously
not one who would be willing to see the officials of the I. G. Farben trust, or
of the Thyssen or Krupp enterprises, for example, permitted to hide behind
their political or military "front" men.
The definition does not include offenses committed by members of the
armed forces on their own initiative, in their private capacities, and in that
sense unconnected with military operations; and it does not include treason-
able acts committed by subjects of the States comprising the United Na-
tions, e.g., offenses of the Quisling class. For the former are punishable in any
event by domestic or military tribunals; and the latter are cognizable by the
courts of the injured State.
Nor does Professor Glueck favor the employment of de luxe but legally
unfamiliar charges like the "supreme offense against international morality
and the sanctity of treaties" 4 on which the Kaiser was futilely "arraigned"
under Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles. Unfamiliar charges make for
unpredictable results; and, as the author points out, there are tried and
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murder, kidnapping, robbery, rape, mayhem and extortion-which fit the
atrocities of this war quite well enough.5
II
The Axis war criminals who have been captured, tried, and punished by
members of the United Nations to date represent but a small fraction of the
whole, and include few major figures. The real question is how we are going
to feel after the armistice-and how in our own best interests we should
feel-about the many tens of thousands of these offenders, and about the
prime movers among them.
My guess (and, I gather, the author's) is that unity of point of view in this
matter will not prove simple of achievement. For, if our experience of the
group reactions to the more familiar forms of peace-time criminal behavior
suggests anything, it is that outlaw behavior in a society as complex as our
own stimulates conflicting responses, especially where the outlaw behavior
is at all unusual or unfamiliar.
One foreseeable reaction will be that all of the rascals should be hung or
shot. But few so reacting will be thinking of participating personally in the
blood bath, and would probably exhibit a certain constraint if advised that a
fellow guest at dinner was during working hours the State executioner. An
inclination to leave the bulk of the dirty business to the liberated peoples of
the Nazi-occupied countries and to the Russians may also be anticipated.
This, however, would assume our willingness to hand over even the highest-
ranking German politicians and industrialists who may fall into our hands,
and our ability in the years to come to control the pressures from within and
from without which might prompt some of our spokesmen to criticize the
policies of the Russians and of these others in their handling of the war crim-
inals. Otherwise our present Allies might fail to appreciate our attitude in
the matter, to the detriment of the entente desired. And then there is the
mood in which the program developed after the last war for bringing war
criminals to justice was allowed to bog down. As we become preoccupied
with the more attractive and seemingly more constructive tasks of the
peace, we may once again be tempted to put this gruesome legacy of the
war out of our minds, to suspect. that many of these war-time accusations
were but cases of the pot calling the kettle black, and to drift into a per-
suasion that in any event such things are unlikely to happen again.
But'if responses are thus conflicting, it does not follow that one alone
should be selected for endorsement and the rest disregarded. The problem
here, as in formulating a program for dealing with any kind of crime, is to
achieve a more complex unity of plan offering some integrated satisfaction
of the diverse interests which we in common with the rest of the world have
in these war criminals and in their crimes.
The interests to be accommodated, as Professor Glueck sees them, are
5. P. 37. The same thesis is implicit in RADIN, THE DAY OF RECKONING (1943).
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these: (1) To "guard against the Nazis and other Fascists leading us round
by the nose as did the German military clique at the close of the last world
cataclysm." (2) To "establish a vital symbol of the existence of the la, of
nations not merely in musty tomes but in the relations and behavior of
States and their subjects." (3) To "derive as much insurance as we possibly
can against future war atrocities, through whatever deterrence there may be
in the punishment of those who have defied the laws of legitimate warfare
and of civilized penal codes." (4) To "at the same time, recognize that
however true it be that millions of the doers of dark deeds were illing and
even enthusiastic participants in the ruthless acts of enslavement, brutality,
massacre, looting and receiving of stolen goods that are chargeable to the
Axis peoples, many others were themselves but helpless victims of tyrannical
political systems forced to participate in the crimes of their masters"-and
so not to exclude altogether "reformative programs, through correction,
psychotherapy, education, religion and other devices of rehabilitation...."
And (5) to "take into account the understandable cry for retribution that
rises from the anguished hearts of the countless victims of Nazi-Fascist
bestiality." 6
III
Judicial process should be employed in dealing with all categories of the
war criminals, in the author's view, partly because it is the civilized way, and
partly because he considers the demonstration essential to strengthen the
prestige of international law. There should, of course, be no attempt to try
large groups of these war criminals jointly. We have had our own experi-
ences with mass conspiracy trials such as that of the alleged seditionists
which recently culminated in a mistrial in the District of Columbia. With
this reservation, the author's contention that strong judges could prevent
the proposed trials from being turned into sounding-boards for Axis propa-
ganda is probably justified.
This brings us to the choice of tribunals. The proposal-and this is in
accord with various official pronouncements of United Nations' statesmen,
including the Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943-is that the vast
majority of the offenders should be tried in the domestic criminal or military
tribunals of the injured nations, under the laws of the liberated countries
in which their crimes were committed.
But many crimes have been committed inside as well as outside Germany
against subjects of the United Nations-against prisoners of war, for exam-
ple, and against forced laborers. The proposal to turn the offenders in such
cases over to the State of the victim will probably raise doubts in the minds
of many jurists who are committed to the territorial principle of criminal
jurisdiction. Professor Glueck's answer is that exceptions to the territorial
principle in favor of crimes "threatening the security of a State, or interfering
6. Pp. 16-7.
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with the functioning of its public agencies and instrumentalities" 7 have long
been recognized, and that the reasons for recognizing extraterritorial
jurisdiction in the present situation are at least as compelling.
The chief problem is presented by the remaining categories of offenders
whose crimes have no particular geographical location outside one of the
Axis countries. They include the Heads of State, and other prominent
officials and industrialists. They include those whose crimes were com-
mitted in several countries or against the nationals of several of the United
Nations. They include those whose crimes were against their own nation-
als-as against the Jews in Germany-or against others who may be unable
to prove their nationality. And there are the crimes over which an injured
nation may for reasons of expediency or of security prefer not to exercise
jurisdiction. For all of these the author advocates joint action by the United
Nations, in the form of trials before an international criminal court to be
set up for the purpose.
An alternative would be the creation of a joint United Nations military
tribunal; and this was the solution accepted by the American members
(Lansing and Scott) of the Commission on Responsibilities set up at the close
of World War I. But one objection to such a solution has been stated by
General Marcel deBaer of the Belgian Cour Militaire, and is quoted in the
book:
"Lansing and Scott assumed the military courts abroad con-
formed to the model of United States Military'Courts and Commis-
sions, and that they applied the 'laws of war.' This is . . . a mis-
take: in most countries the military courts have their own statutory
law, and they are neither allowed to apply 'martial law' (which sim-
ply does not e~ist) nor the 'law of war.' One can visualize the
muddle that would have been created if ever it had been attempted
to put Art. 229 of the Versailles Treaty into practice, each judge
trying to apply a different law." 8
And since the offenders are to be charged with ordinary crimes recognized
in all penal codes of civilized nations, and brought to trial after military
operations have ceased and order has been restored, it does seem more
appropriate to employ a non-military tribunal and procedure.
Proposals to establish an international criminal court similar to that
contemplated by the author have been made in the past. He reviews these,
and considers the legal objections which were interposed on those prior
occasions. There was, for example, the proposal of Baron Descamps of
Belgium, then President of the Advisory Committee of jurists who drafted
the statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, that an inter-





acter of the offense, . . . fix the penalty and . . .decide the means by
which the terms of the sentence are to be enforced.' "0 The proposal was
finally shelved after a committee of the First Assembly of the League of
Nations reported that there was not yet a penal law,- recognized by all
nations.'
0
But here we are a generation later. What is the present status of the legal
objections which so impressed Anglo-American jurists at the close of World
War I? The author takes these head on.
He contends that the proposed court could appropriately draw its law
from "the rich reservoirs of common and conventional law of nations and the
principles, doctrines and standards of criminal law that constitute the com-
mon denominator of all civilized penal codes." 11 The penalties applied
would be based "either upon the punishments permitted by the law of
nations in the case of piracy and violations of the laws and customs of war-
fare or upon those provided for crimes of similar nature and gravity by the
law of the accusing State, taking into account, also, where necessary in
individual instances, the law of the defendant's State." 12
There remain, of course, the familiar objections that Heads of State are
immune from trial by any jurisdiction other than their own, and that the
defenses of "acts of State" and of "obedience to the orders of a military
superior" would be available under existing law to many if not to most of
those characterized by the author as war criminals. A painstaking analysis
of the precedents and doctrine relating to these objections is one of the most
valuable features of this book, and it leads the author to dismiss the objec-
tions as untenable.
IV
Assuming that the war criminals may be brought to judgment and con-
victed to our satisfaction, we face the final problem of what should then be
done with them. In our interest in this we are of course not alone. What
each of the members of the United Nations may do with those convicted in
its own tribunals had therefore better be regarded, as the author suggests, as
its own concern. The real problem is as to the policy to be urged upon the
proposed international court, and to be pursued by the United States with
reference to those war criminals over whom we may assume sole jurisdiction.
Since the more individualized and rehabilitory techniques which have
evolved from our experience of penology are best adapted to offenders whose
behavior, while deviational, conforms much more closely to the norms of our
society than does the behavior of these war criminals, and since the number
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Professor Glueck concludes that "routine mass-methods of penology" 13
will be unavoidable in most of the cases.But, as he also points out, we shall learn little from such procedures of
"what mental mechanisms have been developed by the Nazi and Japanese
techniques of 'education for death,' and how those mechanisms might be
counteracted, reconditioned or destroyed." 14 And we are going to need that
knowledge. For a significant portion of the German people will survive the
peace, and this portion will include a younger generation. We shall have to
be concerned with programs for the re-education of this younger generation,
and eventually with the question of their eligibility to self government, or at
least to full citizenship in some State or States.
Some procedure for screening out representative samples of the war crim-
inals for scientific study, and for the selection of individual prisoners offering
the most promise of rehabilitation, with a view to their gradual return to
normal life, is therefore indicated. The author suggests an "observation and
quarantine period" " 5 -not unlike the tentative sentence stage contemplated
in our recently proposed Federal Corrections Act '6-for those who are not
sentenced to death.
The gist of Professor Glueck's point of view thus appears to be that while
the war crimes present a novel and unprecedentedly complex problem, our
resources of law are adequate; that while the atrocious quality and vast
scale of these war crimes dictate mass methods of disposition and considera-
ble compromise, we can nevertheless not afford to scrap civilized standards
in coping with them; and that it is extremely important that we cope posi-
tively and effectively. It is also apparent that he is unimpressed with the
common argument that punishment of the Axis leaders might result in
their martyrization, so long as they are brought to trial before an irlterna-
tional rather than a foreign national tribunal, and so long as the laws and
values applied are confined to those recognized by civilized nations generally
as distinguished from those of a particular State.
His central thesis-that there is a sufficient international body of law to
permit adoption of the proposed course without doing violence to the ex post
facto and nulla poena sine lege principles-will naturally not go unchallenged.
The thesis rests on a conception of law which is dynamic, and which would
not deny to the judicial process a role coequal with the legislative and the
executive in the fashioning from emerging social norms of the principles
which are to be backed by group force. I cannot speak as an international
lawyer; but as a creature of common-law training and tradition, I find
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THm DEVICE OF GOVERNMENT. By John Laird. Cambridge: At the Uni-
versity Press, 1944. Pp. 173. 6 s.
Tins "essay on civil polity" is a classic hot off the academic griddle. The
author raises, plays with, answers for our times the unanswerable questions
with which the Greeks-or such of them as commented from the side-lines--
delighted to torment themselves. These are all here, the why and the how.
of what price the political order, of the rationale of its make-up, of whether
or not the human race rates a republic. Inquiries which are old are oriented
to a society which is new; ancient quests are followed among up-start phe-
nomena; the spirit of a world in crisis broods over the march of a rigorous and
uneasy logic. Antique spelling rubs shoulders delightfully with colloquial
idiom;"nett"and "premisses" add a quaint touchwhen Cincinnatus "does"-
we Americans would say "struts"-"his stuff." An abiding norm is lighted up
by a everyday illustration; an impulse dominantly friendly may be en-
tangled with alien attitudes; "do you love us, Bill," asked the girl in the
comic paper; "then knock us abaht a bit." The writing, moving always on
the level of the abstract, never quite escapes the facts-and the emotions-
of life. And the scholarly folk-ways which shape the discourse are British
rather than Greek and little touched by American usage. The writer, in the
best of Scottish tradition, scribbles as if he were engaged in a bout at dia-
lectic with Plato and Aristotle. And, as is his right, he scores his points and
sets the great ones of earth straight. There emerges a civilized book, ab-
struse and homely, warm and remote, aloof from the present scene yet
downright relevant.
The book is built around a few questions which are so simple that it takes
a Greek or a Scot to ask them. Is man by instinct a political animal? Are
there distinct types of men whom nature intended to be rulers, subjects,
slaves? Is government a free association established by contract or an in-
stitution to which human beings are fettered by birth and from which death
alone can grant release? What is the role of will, acquiescence, force in
public affairs? Where is the proper line between what people can do if they
choose and what is not a matter of choice? What are the conditions under
which you and I can exercise-or affect to exercise-personal freedom? Does
our power to shape our collective destiny rise above a qualified and very
"mixed voluntary"? Has the state a monopoly upon the power to say the
last word, or do other agencies of society compromise its commands? Is
the argument for democracy no more than that a case cannot be made out
for any of its rivals? If every citizen is a partner in the republic, exactly
what are the perquisites of liberty, fraternity, equality? How is the emergence
of totalitarian authority in this dark age of enlightenment to be explained?
As we drive-or are blindly driven-towards an universal political order,
what changes must occur in the role, the structure, the office of the state?
In explorations along such paths John Laird-the professor of moral phi-
losophy at Aberdeen-brings the tricks of his trade to the "premises" of
1945]
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political science. And if a good deal of what he has to say prompts the
student to a go-on or a so-what, he probes critically into basic issues which
the orthodox priesthood has too long neglected.
In response to such a catechism Laird sets down his creed. But a simple
recitation of articles of faith will never do. As a scholar he must explore
everkf alternative, recite every count to the contrary, wrestle long and hard
with the adversary to vindicate every position. And as a philosopher reason
must be invoked to make persuasive all the propositions which men of our
liberal persuasion have been conditioned to accept. In reconciling human
beings to the necessity of government, he relies upon logic more heavily than
so limited an instrument of social analysis warrants. But the stuff of his
story, even in the abstract form into which he processes it, is too full of
color and drama, too beset with intangibles and human frailty, to be beaten
into a severe march of syllogisms. As a result a number of respectable
dodges are invoked to mediate between the stern drive of the argument and
the turbulent material to which it is addressed. A rigid definition is called
upon to fence off an obstacle; a perplexity becomes an intruder for which
there is no place; anything which threatens to arrest the pace, spoil the
unity, or deflect the argument is somewhat forcibly-and in strict accordance
with the proprieties of the higher learning-put "outside the formal limits
of what is now being discussed." In the end a faith which triumphs over
formidable doubt is securely anchored upbn an appeal to reason.
All of this is not to quarrel or condemn, but to indicate the academic stric-
tures under which the author has consented to work. It is no mean feat that
he has played according to the rules, yet has managed to achieve a work of
art. For it is the texture, not the logic, of his argument which gives distinc-
tion. An easy series of propositions, properly punctuated with "therefores,"
could say that man isnot by instinct a civil animal. With a deft touch and a
twist of doubt Laird sets it down that it is "not clear that men are by nature
heliotropic animals, always turning naturally to the light." He finds hu-
manity prone to fall into-and to amend-the ways of the groups among
which they live. "If"-as he stoops to quote the eternal woman-"sleeping
with a man ain't social, what the hell is." And, taking his soundings of
community life, he finds everywhere, in state, church, market, school, set
ways of carrying on. Yet such usages vary widely, are easily or painfully
amended and, as answers to felt need, are forever in danger of being re-
placed. To regard any one of them is a manifestation of instinct or the
innate is to give up the chance of dealing with it through reason and in-
telligence. If we prate about impulses bound "to prevail in the long run,
we deserve the penalties which attach to amiable folly." Aristotle, then, is
to note that man is a political animal in the sense-and only in the sense-
that government is a human device and that its efficient operation involves
progress in the practice of a complex of difficult arts.
Thus Nature-he does not add Nature's god-is tumbled from an usurped
throne. And its iron laws which profess to hold the destiny of humanity in
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an inflexible grip are declared null and void. In its stead is exhalted man-the-
collect who must endure whatever of felicity and misery his wisdom and
folly decrees. It follows, as if it were a corollary, that Aristotle in his defense
of natural slavery talks nonsense. There are no men, decreed by Nature or
appointed by God, to be natural rulers. Old Samuel once staged the show
by which Saul, who was looking for his father's asses at a most opportune
moment, received the divine tap. And in this sophisticated and decadent
age, whatever gods there are have lost the knack of implanting royal souls
in human bodies. Nor, now that blood has been replaced by the genes in
heredity, does the sublime capacity for operating as top dog easily pass from
monarch to nearest male kin. And, if history is called upon to underwrite
biology, the king-makers have always been a little more intent upon finding
a pliable instrument than in investing the Lord's annointed. Nor is there
evidence-the mentally deficient aside-that there exists a class of men
whose power-to-do is limited to a capacity for drudgery. The view that
"soldiers do not belong to the army, but are merely a part of its equipment,"
will not longer hold. Those who insist that women are too fine for political
activity voice a prejudice when they profess to enunciate a law of nature.
An immigrant may need a period of seasoning before full participation in
public affairs; but science can not be made to testify to the inferiority of any
particular race. No human being "is, or should ever be, the animated tool
of other human beings-a living tool anatomically human." It is easy to
say that it is better "for citizens to be led from an eminence well above their
heads than, getting their heads, to muddle from one disaster to another."
But the natural, that is the self-appointed, ruler is insured no such wisdom
or eminence. After all, a ruler, however selected, is no superman; he is just
an ordinary person in whom his fellows have lodged extraordinary powers;
and there is nothing that we, or the republic, can do but chance it.
In like manner, and to the same glorious end, run the answers to the other
questions. As for a social compact, whence all political authority derives,
"it is imagining a lot to imagine that a political community could be quite
simply a free association." In the political order, which can not start fresh
every year, or even every election, will, consent, force each has its role. The
state, sporting a monopoly in the use of violence, has other compulsions
within its reach; and violence-about which the author has much to say-
may on occasion become "a healthy method for settling disputes." All
great empires have been put together by violence; but origin through force
does not enjoin a later legitimacy. Far too much stress is usually put on the
form of government. A dictator may be a people's man; a republic may
with the years become ossified. Administration has its own compulsions,
dominant whatever the system upon which it is grafted; a dictator plus a
bureaucracy and a people plus a bureaucracy may become indistinguish-
able-save by the use of instruments of precision.
In the end, and with charity to all, the argument converges into four
propositions. There are no political imbeciles save downright imbeciles;
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there are no political children save in the nursery; all other members of the
community are citizens; political responsibility is developed through its
exercise. The gospel according to John Laird runs, "the political government
of a people is justifiable, if the people willingly consent to it, clearly perceiv-
ing that the device of government, for all its drawbacks, is the best way of
obtaining such tolerable conditions and such modest felicity as reasonable
men can expect." Or, in free translation, it is that mankind has the right-
and should be accorded the power-of choosing its own path to the ever-
lasting bonfire.
The reasonable man, however, is an evasive creature and his norm of
judgment wide open. The reviewer, therefore, is free to accept the faith, to
applaud the argument, to register objection along the way. The most serious
quarrel is with the reputable and monopolistic sovereignty with which in
nineteenth century fashion Laird endows the state. He shrinks from an
acceptance of pluralism; however intricate and even disorderly the political
universe, its generalized picture must have a clear-cut line; to recognize a
number of agencies of control, each operating in the orbit of its special
competence, offends the urge towards symmetry. If you are too realistic,
you will spoil the tidy and comfortable pictures in the text-books on social
mythology. There is little here of the politics of industry. You search the
pages in vain for accounts of private corporate government, with its man-
dates and taboos, its codes and police, the sanctions by which it puts the
justice of the state behind its own thou-shalts and thou-shall-nots. Its
dominion over men is far wider and more exacting than you would ever
gather from these chapters. The assumption of the separation of state and
economy is tacitly accepted. The trends towards their fusion, manifest as
clearly in Great Britain as in the United States, are all but ignored. In
their merger, with the current crisis hastening the course of events, an insti-
tution emerges which partakes of each yet is neither. The corporation
dominating its industry has been able to dictate the terms under which the
government carries on its war; the honorable company, in the strategy
hurled at the enemy, acts as the deputy of the state. In peace-time, the
industry gone astray does not accept regulation lying down; it converts,
so far as it can, controls into sanctions and attempts to take into captivity
agencies set up for its supervision. These are the most elementary of facts;
yet the author takes little account of them. They are not alien phenomena,
beyond the range of his observation; for the state and the economy are more
nearly one, and there is far less friction between them in Great Britain than
in the United States. They offer material for a theory-yet to be formu-
lated-of collective bargaining' between the two great agencies of man's
subjection. Against their terrific impact the orthodox theory of political
supremacy demands quite a bit of doing over. To insist as Laird does that
financiers and corporate moguls have to mask their soyereignty to exercise
it begs the question. For the novel, if it is to prevail, is invariably wrapped
in the sanctions of the established; and masking their authority is the condi-
[Vol. 54
REVIEWS
tion upon which the lords of the assembly-line and the masters of "the
legitimate channels of merchandise" exercise it.
The merger of state and economy, however, presents a single facet of a
larger quarrel. It is in the character of formal logic that it invites the
tyranny of either-or; that it is fortified against the mixing of opposites and
the consideration of degree. The author's approach forces him to draw up
sharp just where the texture of the community life becomes most colorful
and dramatic. If, instead of hedging government from all with which it is
tangled, he had broken the social order down into the institutions which
make it up and had inquired into the office of each, his state would have
emerged a less lordly affair. Had he stalked down the centuries, seeking the
dominant power to shape human destiny, his supreme authority would be
discovered to be a changing thing, to be defined only with reference to the
culture in which it was set. Nor is his discourse fitted out with an adequate
conception of social process. In the earthly hurly-burly in which we carry
on, we do not begin anew, turn ideal into actuality, or create according to
blueprint. We are the creatures of all that has gone before, in slavery to
our ignorance of the long-time implications of what we do. Neither deity
nor populace can supply us with a fresh slate whereon to write. Laird's
questions are grand questions; the issue is where do we go from here.
The political order is beset with peradventure; he who utters a book must
take a chance on his critics. Even as judges remake the cases they cite as
authority and the ancient classics are created anew by their interpreters,
almost certainly violence is now being done to Laird's discourse. At best
verbal currency passes uncertainly; and doubtless the author has said things
which have not gotten across and has been made to say what he never put
down on paper. But one thing can not be missed. His questions are put
in the Greek manner; he brings to them the craft of the philosopher; his
discourse moves on a level just below the abstract. But, although his
rhetoric is cosmic and remote, his logic is that of the here and now. In this
great crisis in human affairs, John Laird is mightily concerned with liberty
and authority. All about us, even in Great Britain and the United States,
it is being held that our natural betters should decide what it is best for us
common folk to know, to do, to think. Against such a doctrine, which is
well on its way towards practice, the author asserts, in the idiom of his
trade, the right of man to his own government. For salvation or damnation
is to John Laird still a matter of man's election.
VALTON. HAtuLTONt
t Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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VERDICT ON INDIA. By Beverley Nichols. New York: Harcourt, Brace and
Company, 1944. Pp. 295. $2.50.
"WANTED-3,500,000 School Marms, willing to live alone in isolated
districts. Salary, 60 rupees ($18) a month."
This is the kind of advertisement that is needed, according to Beverley
Nichols, if India is to be educated in any such way as the advanced countries
of the world. He points out why no such educational program is possible.
First, it would cost ten times what India now spends for education, and
would be "considerably more than the total revenue of India itself." Second,
as things are now it would be impossible to find one fiftieth of the required
number of girls sufficiently educated and able to teach. Third, if they could
be found, the problem of protecting them in ordinary villages would be
insoluble because a girl who does such a bold unconventional thing as teach
in an Indian village is regarded as hopelessly immoral.
But why not get men to do the teaching? We are always hearing that the
British system of encouraging the higher rather than the elementary phases
of education has produced a great crop of partly educated young men, many
of whom are unemployed. They are the main supporters of the nationalist
movement. Why not pry them loose from that by giving them jobs as
teachers? The answer is that even if the money were available, you could
not get them away from the cities. "Once you have taken a young man away
from his village you will need a good deal more than wild horses to get him
back again. He would rather starve, and frequently does."
What has just been said illustrates the general tone of Verdict on India.
The book is what the author would call a well considered defense of the
British regime in India. Ardent fndophiles will consider it a bitter and
unjust attack, like Mother India. It is undeniably a severe indictment, but
much of it is true. Nevertheless, it creates a wrong impression for it ascribes
to human frailty many conditions which are due primarily to the geograph-
ical environment. Verdict on India is based largely on the author's own
experiences during a year in that country. From a stay of some months in an
Indian hospital he learned that "there is only one trained nurse to every
65,000 Indians. On a basis of population this figure corresponds, roughly,
with 200 nurses for the whole Dominion of Canada. . . . The next thing I
learnt was that in the City of Peshawar alone there were 60,000 cases of
tuberculosis. . . . If we allotted only one nurse to every ten of these un-
fortunates, we would need to employ the entire nursing community of India
in the city of Peshawar alone. . . . It seemed shameful to be lying in bed
under a bell which would summon a nurse who was needed by 65,000 people
in pain."
In the last sentence of this quotation Nichols did not say quite what he
meant, but he expressed a deeper truth which he seems only vaguely to
realize. He meant of course that the nurse was needed by those who were ill
among 65,00.0. The deeper truth is that most of the 65,000 are actually in a
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chronic state of physical weakness. They may not be ill, but all their lives
they exist at a low level of vitality. Physical inertia is the unstable founda-
tion upon which stands the whole fabric of the economic, social, political and
religious organization of India. So long as this continues, all else that can be
done for India is no more effective than a hot compress to relieve the pain of
an ulcerated tooth that ought to be extracted.
Nichols' book is full of examples of the effects of this physical weakness,
although he does not put it that way. Because of it there is mental inertia;
because of mental inertia there is overpopulation, poverty and stagnation.
And because their own weakness has prevented them from doing much to
help their country the Indian Nationalists blame the British. "You have
been here for 150 years," they say, "what have you done about [this terrible
problem of nurses, physicians and health]?"
Mental inertia and physical weakness are tied up with a long string of
other factors with the final result that the Press, for example, is amazingly
weak. "At home one thinks of [the subscribers of a newspaper] in terms of
millions, or at least hundreds of thousands; out here--in a country where
everything else is on so vast a scale-he has to think in terms of two or three
thousand, sometimes even two or three hundred.. . .Any one with a vide
knowledge of the world's press will probably agree that in no part of Europe,
the Empire, or the Americas has he encountered anything even vaguely
comparable with the corruption and dishonesty of Hindu journalism. Lying
is carried to a fine art."
As for Art with a capital A "in no other country of the world would [the
products of Bombay's Art Society] be given wall space. . . .We shall find
the artists of young Indian staring fixedly into the past. For them the sun
never rises, it only shines as a distant gleam in the gold of the Ajanta dra-
peries.. . . There is food for thought in the spectacle of these young dream-
ers. They are of course fiercely nationalist; they are always shouting 'For-
ward,' and they are always looking back."
As for Music, which deserves a capital letter quite as much as the Press
and Art, India simply has none in our sense of the word. There are indeed
a number of native musical instruments, and people frequently sing, but
according to Nichols, two conditions prevent the resultant sounds from
constituting an art. First, "the actual quality of the sound with which the
Indian makes his music is of altogether minor importance." In other words,
mere noise rather than melody and harmony are the objective. Second, and
even more significant, Indian music has never been reduced to any definite
native system of notation. Therefore this sort of thing is typical: a court
musician of the Maharaja of X played a composition by Thyagaraja, a
musician who died about a century ago. When Nichols asked for its repeti-
tion in order that he might write it down, the musician played part of it the
same as before, but other parts were quite different. When asked the reason
for this, he seemed puzzled. Like other Indian musicians, he apparently did
not remember any exact composition. He improvised so much that he did
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not know what was his own and what was the work of the old musician.
Such an art is most interesting psychologically. It seems to indicate
weakness in the power of mental concentration. The Indian mind-of course
there are ten thousand minds-seems to find difficulty in reducing ideas to a
definite pattern which can be passed on to other people and rigorously
tested. Nichols seems to indicate that even the better minds of India rarely
possess the power to frame a complex document like the Declaration of
Independence in such form that it is not self-contradictory. To the reviewer
this means weakness in thb power to concentrate upon a mental problem
and carry it to a sound conclusion.
Nichols criticizes Gandhi rather bitterly for just this kind of mental
inefficiency. He goes so far as to accuse that Indian leader of rank dis-
honesty or else of almost incredible forgetfulness, or childlike inconsistency.
He quotes with approval from an Indian Nationalist, N. M. Roy, whom he
describes as "rock-bottom honest, and rock-bottom honest Indian politicians
are rarer than diamonds." Here are Roy's words: "Gandhism was created
by the ignorance, the blind faith, and hero-worship of the backward Indian
masses. Gandhism is the expression of the worst in our people, of its igno-
rance, its cowardice, its defeatism, its backwardness."
Some of the most important factors in India's backwardness are relegated
to a few pages devoted to "Loose Ends." There the author speaks of "the
inefficiency of agricultural methods." He points out that millions of old
and useless cattle ought to be killed, that cattle manure ought to be used as
fertilizer instead of being burned to cook food, and that better tools ought
to be used. He leaves practically untouched, however, the most fundamental
agricultural and social problem, namely overpopulation. Because of the
density of population the eight-tenths of the inhabitants who depend more
or less directly on agriculture cannot possibly be well fed, nor can they have
the energy whereby to accumulate capital, purchase f6rtilizer, and equip
themselves with better tools. Three hundred years ago, as the reviewer has
shown in a new book called Mainsprings of Civilization, India was far better
fed than now. It had little more than one-fourth the present population.
Therefore the people had room enough so that they were not forced to limit
their diet to the crops which yield the most calories regardless of vitamins
and 'minerals. Thus in the days when the Taj Mahal was built the Indian
people, at least those of the North, were apparently much more vigorous
than now.
Although Nichols fails to dig down to certain fundamental concepts such
as overpopulation, he has written a most stimulating book. Whether one
agrees with him or not, he certainly makes it clear that most Americans do
not really understand the Indian problem. He also shows that although
Great Britain has made mistakes, they have been largely unconscious. In
fact Verdict on India furnishes still another interesting bit of evidence that if
India's plight is to be understood, one must first obtain a clear understand-
ing of the physical capacities of the people. One must also gaih a new con-
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ception of the relation of man's mental processes to overpopulation, to a
debilitating climate, to a wretched diet, to all manner of diseases, and to an
agriculture which is exceedingly unprofitable and unreliable by reason of
poor soil and erratic rainfall.
ELLsWOrTn HUNT NGONt
DIAGNOSIS OF OUR Timm. By Karl Mannheim. New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1944. Pp. viii, 196. S3.00.
Tnn trailblazing sociologist and author of such books as Ideology and
Utopia 1 and Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction,2 has issued his
diagnosis: a blueprint of Planning for Freedom in the spirit of the democratic
traditions of the English-speaking world. Half of the book, the first six
chapters, is a collection and adaptation of three lectures given at Oxford
(1941), Cambridge (1942), and Nottingham (1941), an article reprinted from
Educating for Democracy,3 and a BBC Overseas Broadcast (1941). 4 The
original essay and lecture form has been retained to indicate the author's
intention to integrate systematic thought with present day relevance. The
seventh chapter, the other half of the book, "was written for a group of
British friends, Christian thinkers," 5 and, significantly, deals with "the
relationship to, and the function in, society which religion has as one among
other spiritual phenomena in the social process." 0
In a preface to the American edition-the book was published first in
England, in 1943-Mannheim contrasts the British asset, a readiness to
conform, with the American liability, self-assertiveness; however, he in-
dicates that a more articulate awareness of social needs may be more notice-
able in America than in Great Britain:
The diagnosis: we are living in an age of transition from laissez-faire to a
planned society
The dilemma: planning with dictatorship or on the basis of democratic con-
trol.
Living as we do, no longer in a parochial world but in a mass society, we
are in the process of being governed by new social techniques, that is, new
methods which aim at influencing human behavior. In the hands of a few,
these new techniques tend to foster minority rule.8
t Professor of Geozraphy. Yale University.
1. MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA (2d ed. 1939).
2. MANNHEIM, MAN AND SOCIETY IN AN AGE OF RECONsTRUCTION, (3d ed. 1942).
3. COHEN AND TRAvFRs (eds.), EDUCATING FOR DEMOCRACY (1939).
4. Reprinted from THE LISTENER (London), June 19,1941.
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The main question, fully raised and partly answered in the book may be
phrased as follows: how can the new social technigues be efficiently 11sed and
efficiently controlled in a democracy? Asked at a strategic moment, at a time
when the use of the new techniques is still not fully monopolized by a minor-
ity in the English-speaking world, it compels the most urgent consideration
here and now, in England as well as in the United States. Mannheim's
answer: planning, not laissez-faire; but it must be a Planning for Freedom,
not for dictatorship.
Not unlike other thorough intellectuals, Mannheim seems enough of a
Platonist to wonder more successfully about questions than to decide con-
vincingly about practical answers. His analysis of "The Crisis in Valua-
tion," 9 especially his precise description of our still parochial value system as
dangerously unadapted to a mass society, is quite pungent. "It is possible
to love your neighbor whom you know personally, but it is an impossible
demand to love people of a wider area whom you do not even know." 10
.. . property only meant the protection of the tools of the man who did
socially useful work . . . in a world of large-scale industrial techniques,.
the very same principle of the private ownership of the means of production
implies the right to the exploitation of the many by the few." " The solu-
tion of such problems boils down to such rather general proposals and
requests as: we must give up our "disinterest" in valuation, 2 have more
self-discipline,' 3 prepare the grotnds for consensus, remove such environ-
mental obstacles as unemployment, malnutrition, lack of education, study
the conditions under which disagreement arises (the main example given
being the Chicago Commission's Report on Negro Riots),14 and have faith
that the integrating efforts are as genuine as the disintegrating forces, al-
though Mannheim admits, not without a touch of unintended humor: "the
trouble . . . is that the social mechanisms which ought to guide value
integration and mediation are being continually suppressed." '6
Youth, one of the most important latent spiritual resources for the re-
vitalization of our society, is to become a pioneering force in a militant
democracy. Mannheim sees the danger involved in the British attitude of
underrating and stifling the dynamic potentialities of youth. He refers, in
notes only, to American studies of adolescence during these last years.10 He
advocates an education for the "blending of attitudes," i.e., conformity with
regard to basic democratic issues, and individual freedom with regard to








16. Pp. 180, 183.
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need for more conscious social awareness in educational practice, awareness
of a society whose members may no longer rely, half consciously, on a set of
more or less generally accepted assumptions and valuations. The Motion
Picture Project of the New York Commission on Human Relations would
have been a case in point to illustrate Mannheim's vision of "attitudinal
blending." 17 In this project, excerpts from motion pictures were presented
to a variety of groups of young people, students in high schools, colleges,
boys and girls in reform schools, men and women in prisons, and in institu-
tions for the mentally ill. Their responses to the motion picture excerpts
were recorded. It may be said, in general, that their responses, as expressed
by them in discussions after the pictures had been shown, progressed from a
purely subjective level of evaluation in terms of each individual's personal
problems to a more and more objective understanding of the social problems
disclosed in the pictures. The result may be said to have been the creation
of group reactions on a remarkably high level of social maturity. This is
only one out of many examples which could be referred to in an attempt to
implement Mannheim's concept of "attitudinal blending."
With the exception of the long Chapter VII (half of the book), Mannheim,
admittedly, deals with the concept of values in a deliberately onesided way.3
He does not deal with differences which refer to the inner qualities of the
various values, but with the social functions they seem to him to fulfil. There
is much unadmitted dialectical materialism of Mannheim's earlier period in
this "simpler" way of valuation. In the seventh chapter the author occa-
sionally attempts to transcend this approach, and the inner qualitative
appreciation of values comes within the scope of his analysis.
Chapter VII, the "Challenge to Christian Thinkers by a Sociologist,"
should be welcome in many respects to all those--ministers as well-who are
concerned about the fact that the Church of Jesus Christ shares a place, in
the appreciation of many people, with the Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Clay Pigeons.'9 Planned society needs a unifying purpose. It can
be achieved either by the extermination or internment of those who do not
agree, or by a spiritual integration of the members of society. Is Christianity
vital enough to integrate spiritually a planned society? Mannheim says:
"Yes." But he says it with tepid faith.
Mannheim shows considerable understanding of the fact that very ancient
and ingrained patterns of religious experience may be successfully applied to
the interpretation of actual present day needs and to situations which seem
to have little or nothing in common with the religious experiences of early
Christianity. He grants the preservation of "primordial images" (Burck-
hardt's term, who took it from St. Augustine) or "archetypes" (C. G. Jung's
term) such as the Hero, the Sage, the Virgo, the Saint, the Repentants,
17. TMRTY SCHOOLs TELL Turm SToRY (Adventure in American Education, Vol-
ume V) (1943) 308-9.
18. P.179,n.ltoc.II.
19. Stroup, A Soldier Loo!s at the Church (1944) 1S9 HARPER'S MAGAMINE 397.
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Baptism, Absolution, Agape, the Eucharist, the Good Shepherd, the Cross,
the Redemption. 2 He does not embark upon the question whether "arche-
types" are inherited through the brain structure from one generation to the
next, and whether we have to introduce-contrary to Freud-the hypothesis
of a collective unconscious. 21 The experiences with such concepts are para-
digmatic, which is to say that the concepts are to be understood as con-
figurations, patterns, "gestalten," basic and essential for the revelation of
one's "Weltanschauung." 22 Life as a whole is being interpreted from the
center of some such basic and pretty widely applicable-that is, paradig-
matic-experience. "One may discuss whether the basic Christian experi-
ence is original sin, redemption, the liberating and creative power of love
or the Cross, the deeper meaning of suffering. It is from these foci of experi-
ence that the adjustment patterns of right behaviour and conduct are
always reinterpreted." 23 These paradigmatic experiences "preserve primor-
dial images which emanate from the archaic depth of the mind;" 24 but
there is no reason why these primordial pictures should justify "historical
absenteeism." 25 Indeed, according to Mannheim, Communism and Hu-
manitarianism are also directed by such primordial visions of ultimately
quite archaic origin but not less readily applicable to modern situations.
Summarizing, Mannheim points towards the following tangible instances
of the Planning for Freedom as it actually has been begun:
(1) The calculation in terms of private costs is gradually being replaced
by a calculation in terms of "social costs" (e.g., how much is spent on un-
employment by the community at large).
(2) In the sphere of working incentives there is a move from purely
financial recompense to service.
(3) As to psychological needs, there is a move away from the craving for
exclusively private security towards a more integrated attitude in which
security for everybody is combined with collective venture in social and
cultural fields.
(4) Campaigns of slum clearance, the creation of settlements and educa-
tional advance, seem to show that we are beginning to understand the con-
cept of freedom in terms more creative than the activity of financial invest-
ment.
(5) There is a move towards a truer democracy which through careful
decentralization of functions allots a creative social task to everyone.2
In view of the very sophisticated precision of Mannheim's conceptual
formulations, it seems surprising that the far-sighted visions of the author
20. P. 147.
21. P. 187, n. 10.







have not led him to visualize the highly problematic nature of the concept
of Time itself, the very concept with regard to which he proposes a "diagno-
sis." One might have expected that he would have appreciated the fact that
the problems involved in redefining the concept of Time itself is not only
significant in the seclusion of Einstein's laboratory; this fact has begun to
involve the whole structure of thinking in the field of the social sciences as
well. After the revolutionary formulations of men like Einstein, Schradinger
and Heisenberg, it will seem rather awkwuard to continue to visualize Time
in History as a straight line, with the naive implication that progress, social
and moral, is to be conceived as a motion in one direction from "lower"
states to "higher" and "higher" levels of social thinking. There is much
naive Darwinism in such an implication, naive and brutally un-Christian-in
other words, there is in such an implication the very opposite of what Mann-
heim proposes in the second half, the "Christian" half, of his treatise. It so
happens that the most sensitive and the most representative evaluators in
the field of social development, the great writers such as Thomas Mann,
Marcel Proust, James Joyce, have been seen to vibrate, consciously or un-
consciously, with the realization of the relativity of Time, not in physics
only, but at the core of human experience. The work of those men is full of
evidence that human experiences and valuations cannot be adequately
strung up like so many beads on a straight thread. What is "earlier," "less
developed" in Swann's experiences? What is "later," what is on the "lower
level," what is on the "higher level"? In the "diagnosis" by the prophets of
"Our Time," "earlier" experiences are seen supplemented, elaborated, made
more real in the light of "later" experiences, and vice versa. "Earlier" and
"later" seem to grow side by side, and, paradoxically, they seem to grow
simultaneously on and through each other. There is no awareness of such
insight in the formulation of Mannheim's diagnosis.
Strange as it may seem, the author's sensitive and, as of today, courageous
re-examination of Christian values might have been corroborated by con-
fronting Einstein with the Apostles. And what is even stranger, such con-
frontation seems to be worked out now in the often so barren field of philol-
ogy. Leo Spitzer, Professor of Romance Languages at Johns Hopkins, has
begun to show that some of the naive Christian writers of medieval France
conceived of a "later" version of an "earlier" story as the glose, the dilucida-
tion of an "earlier" event, which, in its turn, thus becomes a prefiguration of
the "later" versionY There is, according to Spitzer, no "earlier" and no
"later," there is one truth only, the Christian truth, first revealed in pre-
figurations or earlier versions, and, then, still the same truth, more fully
revealed through gloses to these prefigurations. The "later" versions live
more fully with reference to the "earlier" versions, and the "earlier" versions
live and develop their timeless genuine meaning simultaneously on and
through the "later" versions.
27. See Spitzer, The Prologue to the Lais of Marie de France and Mcdieral Poetics (1943)
41 AMODERN PHIOLOGY 96.
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True, Mannheim should not be criticized for his lack of interest in medie-
val France. But it should be noticed that Mannheim, in a book about the
c6mpatibility of modem Science and Christianity, seems so utterly unaware
of the fact that such compatibility has begun to be sensed by representative
writers and even, where it might have been least expected, in the dusty
stacks of philologists.
And yet, it seems that some such awakening to an outlook on History and
Progress other than a naively rectilinear one is imperative for the sincere
revitalization of our Faith, the Faith that would make us experience Our
Time in a manner more scientific, but not less mysterious, than in the days
of the Apostles.
ALFRED ADLERt
THE REAL SOVIET RUSSIA. By David J. Dallin; translated by Joseph
Shaplen. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944. Pp. 260. $3.50.
Al ERICANs have a duty henceforth to acquaint themselves not only with
the social system of Russia, a great ally, but with a social system competing
with their own. For.that reason, the present book should be obligatory read-
ing. The author, a Menshevik Russian located in this country, and a dis-
tinguished scholar, has obtained access to Russian publications which for the
most part are closed books to American citizens. The work makes authentic
and fascinating reading because it rests to a large extent on statistics which
are embroidered by great historical and social insight. Without sign of
.hostility or denunciation, it exposes the weakness of the Russian social
system as few books have done. If any American believes that the United
States has much that is beneficial to learn from the system of Soviet Russia-
the so-called "dictatorship of the proletariat"-he has but to read The Real
Soviet Russia to be enlightened. Russian citizens who were accustomed to
Czarist rule might submit to the new form of regimentation. Those who
profit by it might even like it. But how any American citizen can endorse
the loss of every vestige of freedom and submit to the hardships and dangers
of the individual under the Soviet regime is a little beyond comprehension.
The author demonstrates his superiority as an historian and sociologist
by his analysis of the limits of Stalin's realism, and by his understanding of
Trotsky's expansionist aims. Short chapters on the religious and foreign
policy show a tolerant understanding of a doctrinaire concelition. But the
author's major contributions lie in his analysis of the new social structure:
the bureaucracy, the new "Upper Classes," already amounting, with fami-
lies, to 28 million people who must be supported; the working class, for
whose alleged benefit the whole revolution was begun; the peasantry, who
have changed masters but remain in abject poverty; the large group dedi-
t Professor of Modern Languages, Northland College.
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cated to "forced labor," who seem to be treated below the human level; the
Communist Party, a small group of tried and true doctrinaires, and their
supporting henchmen in the self-serving Komsomol; the Red Army; and the
NKVD, the secret police, numbering in excess of two million.
It is regrettable that the Soviet experiment as not permitted to proceed
without obstacle. The Bolshevik government, even though of startlingly
novel type, should have received recognition in 1920. The promiscuous
confiscation of private property was of course shocking to the vestern world,
but its illegalities or the resulting protest seem to have become tempered
with the passage of time and with that sudden need for Soviet Russia as an
ally which has led to the pouring of billions into the Soviet maw by the
erstwhile victims of confiscation. It is probable that the author suspects
that the magnificent performances of the Red Army are rendered in the
name of Russia rather than of Communism, for Communism is but a remote
hope for the future when the "state" shall have withered away. The sole
present reality is state socialism. It appears clear, however, that the tight
little group in the Politbureau have abandoned none of their aims and are
likely to drive through to the bitter end.
That Soviet Russia is riding for an eventual fall Dr. Dallin does not doubt.
Its economic miscalculations, apart from its incidental social evils, he exposes
and necessarily condemns. He expects the disintegration to become evident
at the end of the present war, though, politically speaking, Soviet Russia
will by that time have completed the metamorphosis from the most despised
to the strongest nation in Europe and Asia. What this will mean for the
western world only time can tell.
EDwn BORC Bj
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INzDinAN L.kW. By Felix S. Cohen. Washington:
United States Government Printing Office. Pp.xxiv, 662. $2.00.
Tins is a thorough and a comprehensive book, and its title does not belie
its content. It represents an editorial achievement of signal merit: thousands
of cases, statutes, treaties and administrative rulings, often inconsistent and
usually unavailable, have been collected in an organic treatment for
the first time. Its twenty-three chapter headings include Federal Indian
Legislation, The Scope of Tribal Self-Government, Personal Rights and
Liberties of Indians, Tribal Property, and Indian Treaties-to mention
only a few. A wealth of technical detail never interferes vith readability;
expertise is given substance by "a belief that the protection of minority
rights and the substitution of reason and agreement for force and dicta-
tion represent a contribution to civilization, a belief that confusion and
ignorance in fields of law are allies of despotism, . . .a belief that under-
t Justus S. Hotchkiss Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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standing of the law, in Indian fields as elsewhere, requires more than textual
exegesis, requires appreciation of history and understanding of economic,
political, social, and moral problems." 1
Those who have been vexed by the recent Supreme Court decision in the
Shoshone Indians case 2 and by the somewhat Kiplingesque language of its
opinions may find support for their concern in reading that Indian treaties
are not "somehow of inferior validity." ' They may nostalgicly ponder the
proposition, laid down in 1942, that such treaties are of the same dignity as
those with foreign nations-"a view which has been repeatedly confirmed
by the federal courts and never successfully challenged." 4
Cohen's book reminds us that problems of minority rights and the grave
question of how to administer occupied territory of an alien culture have
been with us for a long time, and that we can learn from our past experiences.
F. M. 0.
1. P. xviii.
2. Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 65 Sup. Ct. 690 (U. S.
1945).
3. P. 33.
4. Pp. 33-4.
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